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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceedings in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah, State of Utah:
1. Deborah E. Anderson, Petitioner/Appellant, is represented by Gregory 
B. Wall and Nathan B. Wall of Wall & Wall, apc, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Kelly L. Anderson, the Respondent and Appellee, is represented by 
Brent D. Young, of Ivie & Young, Provo, Utah.
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In this brief “R” refers to the record of the court, “Ex” refers to exhibit, 
followed by the exhibit number, and “TR” refers to transcripts of the court.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and §78-2a-3, Utah Code 
Annotated.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 ISSUE 1  :   Whether Appellant was denied due process of law for denial of the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding time periods for child support and 
whether monies she received followed the children.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  The trial court’s interpretation of binding 
case law is viewed as presenting a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992).  Also, this issue deals 
directly with common law fundamental and Constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, 
which is always preserved.  
ISSUE 2:  Did the court abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant to pay all 
attorney’s fees for all parties at the January 20, 2009 hearing when Appellee could 
not have prevailed on his motion at said hearing due to his noncompliance with 
court orders and the rules of Civil Procedure even if Appellant’s Motion to Strike 
had been denied. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
parent time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the 
court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.  Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (2). 
Statutory interpretation by a trial court presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 
1992).    
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ISSUE 3  :   Whether a District Court Commissioner has the authority to hold 
someone in contempt for penalties greater than those of mere courtroom violations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  Statutory interpretation by a trial court 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.  Similarly, the trial 
court’s interpretation of binding case law is viewed as presenting a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 
1992). 
ISSUE 4: Whether the trial court erred in signing the Order from the August 18, 
2009 hearing despite there being an Objection, and without ruling on or addressing 
the objection.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  Statutory interpretation by a trial court presents a 
question of law,  which is reviewed for  correctness.   Similarly,  the trial  court’s 
interpretation of binding case law is viewed as presenting a question of law and is 
reviewed  for  correctness.  State  v.  Richardson,  843  P.2d  517,  518  (Utah  App. 
1992).   Additionally,  the trial  court’s  interpretations  of  rules  of  procedure is  a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness.  State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Appellant submits that the following Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional 
provisions may be determinative of certain issues in this Appeal:
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U.S. Const. Art. V
[Amendment]
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that 
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 & U.S. Const. XIV Amend. 
§ 7 [Due prcess of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.
U.S. Const. Art. XIV, § 1
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2)
§ 30-3-3 (2)
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney 
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fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or 
defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10
§ 78-32-10
When contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or 
judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which an order must be 
made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, 
adjudging that the person proceeded against it thereby guilty of a contempt, and 
that he be punished.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310
Contempt— Action by court
A justice court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not 
to exceed $500.00 or by incarceration for five days or both. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(a) [Clerical mistakes]
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, 
as the court orders.  During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while 
the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents an appeal from the final judgment of the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, August 18, 2009, the Honorable Darold J. McDade 
presiding, as well as the final judgement from hearings stemming from 
recommendations made by the Honorable Thomas Patton, District Court 
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Commissioner, on or about December 15, 2009, January 20, 2009, and entered by 
the Honorable Claudia Laycock on February 6, 2009.            
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.  On or about October 17, 2008, the minor children of the parties were 
removed from the custody of the Petitioner pursuant to an ex parte temporary 
restraining order sought by Appellee, the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, and the 
Special Master, Sandra Dredge, which temporarily placed the minor children in the 
custody of their father, the Appellee.  R. 1367, 812, 809.
2.  The parties had adopted numerous handicapped and special needs 
children, and as a result thereof, received benefits and payments from the various 
states that they adopted the children from, such as California and Nevada. R. 
1366, 1365.  As part of said ex parte temporary restraining, Appellee merely 
alleged that Appellant received $7,000.00 from the State of California and placed 
within said ex parte temporary restraining order, an order entitling him to said 
amount of money, requiring Appellant to pay the same.  R. 1105.   A hearing was 
held on said ex parte temporary restraining order, before the Honorable Thomas 
Patton, District Court Commissioner instead of the presiding Judge Darold 
McDade.  R. 1106.        
3.  Appellant had been served with hundreds of pages of pleadings, and 
exhibits, and requested a continuance due to the volume of material which she had 
been served with at the October 27, 2008 hearing and the short period time 
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between being served with said papers and the hearing on said ex parte order.  R. 
1149.  The Court became angry at the parties for arguing over each other's failures 
and non-compliance with court orders, and inappropriately entered the temporary 
restraining order, denying the Appellant an evidentiary hearing on the merits of 
said restraining order. Shortly after the temporary restraining order was issued, the 
Fourth District Juvenile Court assumed jurisdiction over the issue of custody of the 
parties' minor children, and the allegations which made up the basis for the 
temporary restraining order were litigated there, which afforded Petitioner an 
opportunity to litigate said allegations.  TR.  January 20, 2009, P.4.
4.  As pertaining to said $7,000.00, the same remained an issue in the 
District Court, and the Court ordered that the monies were to follow the children. 
R. 1269.  The Court further ordered, if it had it wrong and had ordered monies to 
one party during a time period that they weren't entitled to monies as they did not 
have custody of the children, or that monies had been spent for necessaries for the 
children, that it would clean' it up at some later hearing.  R. 1246.
5.   The minor  children were later  removed by the State from Appellee's 
home on or about November 12, 2008 due to concerns over his parental fitness. 
Appellee had custody of the children only from October 17, 2008 until November 
12, 2008. R. 1518, 1266.
6.  The Appellee prepared an order which entitled him to a judgment against 
Appellant for said $7,000.00 without ever having produced evidence of any receipt 
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of said monies.  TR.  August 18, 2009, P.60, L. 10-14.  Appellant objected to said 
order, believing that the order of the Court was that the money was to follow the 
children, and Appellant had the children for 17 of the 31 days in October of 2008, 
entitling her to monies for the children for said month for necessaries she incurred 
on their  behalves,  also objecting to  such a  judgment  entering without her  ever 
having been afforded a day in Court and without Appellee ever  producing any 
evidence  such  sums  were  ever  received  by  Appellant,  prompting  Appellant  to 
timely request an evidentiary hearing on the same.  R. 1266, TR. August 18, 2009, 
P. 60, L. 10-14.  Additionally, Appellant has always maintained that said monies 
were paid 1 month behind, and that monies receiving in October of 2008 were for 
child support for the month of September 2008.  R. 1266.  Appellant also alleged 
and  maintained  that  inter  alia,  she  had  incurred  substantial  obligations  and 
expenses for the minor children during the 17 days she had custody of them in 
October of 2008, and that all of the monies received were for support during the 
month  of  September  2008,  and  were  spent  on  expenses  for  the  children  for 
September 2008 and the 17 days in October 2008.  R. 1105, 1266.  As a result of 
the Court's order, Appellant was left having to pay many debts for the children as a 
result  of the Court's orders which entitled Appellee to monies from the various 
states  without the opportunity for Appellent  to be heard,  which have worked a 
significant/substantial  hardship upon Appellant and which are not equitable.  R. 
1266.
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 7.   Appellant  timely  filed  an  objection  to  the  Court's  ruling  as  to  the 
substance  of  the  Court's  ruling  and  as  to  the  form and  content  of  Appellee's 
prepared order, and filed the same with the Court.  R. 1268.  The Court issued an 
order  requiring  counsel  for  the  parties  to  each  obtain  a  copy  of  the  audio 
recording for the October 27, 2008 hearing, and then consult each other regarding 
the content of the order.  R. 1269.  Counsel for Appellant did so, and at a hearing 
in juvenile court regarding the State's attempt to find that Appellant had abused or 
neglected the minor children, requested of counsel for Appellee to have such a 
conference, which request was refused.  R. 1221.
8.  In the interim, Appellee filed a motion for issuance of an order to show 
cause on his interpretation of the Court's order. Said hearing was continued from 
January 20, 2009 until February 23, 2009. R. 1266-68.
9.  At said hearing, the Court acknowledged that its' recommendation was 
not clear, and ordered that Appellee was entitled to $7,000.00 which represented 
monies paid from some of the states the children were adopted from for their 
support, without ever producing any evidence that said monies were received, what 
amounts, whether or not said monies followed the children, or what time periods 
said child support/benefits represented.  R. 1267, TR.  August 18, 2009, P. 71, L. 5. 
10. However, the Court indicated in its' ruling that it would be appropriate 
that an evidentiary hearing take place to determine the aforesaid issues raised by 
Appellant.  TR.  February 23, 2009, P. 37, L. 17.  The Court as a result of its' prior 
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recommendation not being clear, refused to hold Appellant in contempt for 
nonpayment of said expenses and permitted Appellant time to re-file an objection 
in light of the Court's clarified recommendation.  TR.  February 23, 2009, P.37, L2. 
11.  Appellant filed said amended objection in March of 2009.  An 
evidentiary hearing was held on Appellant's objection on August 18, 2009. 
However, the Court declined to allow Appellant to present evidence that the 
alleged $7,000.00 received by her were paid for expenses for the minor children. 
Holding that said amount was an amount counsel previously agreed upon, and 
that “respondent’s motion was well taken.”  R. 1266.  Accordingly, the Court 
entered judgment.  R. 1270.  Appellant has never agreed that she owed $7,000.00, 
nor did she agree that she owed said amount to Appellee for time periods he had 
custody of the minor children, nor did she do so at said August 18, 2009 hearing. 
Appellant repeatedly requested that she be allowed to present evidence, and that 
she disputed monies received in October of 2008 were for the support of the 
children during time periods when Appellee had custody of them, but was denied 
said opportunity. TR.  February 23, 2009, P.37, L. 5-10.  Said ruling deprived 
Appellant her rights of due process of law.
12.  Appellant's pleadings had been stricken on December 15, 2008 for 
alleged non-compliance with prior court orders. Appellant filed a motion to 
reinstate her pleadings. The Court ruled at the February 23, 2009 hearing that it 
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would not hear said motion, unless/until Appellant complied with the following 
Court orders: 
a. Amend a prior tax return pursuant to previous Court order;
b. Personal property of the children be provided to the Guardian ad 
Litem pursuant to previous Court order; and
c. That said $7,000.00 judgment be paid pursuant to the Court's 
clarifying order of that day. TR.  10-25, February 23, 2009.
13.  Appellant does not have $7,000.00 to pay Appellee, and it was 
inappropriate that such an order and judgment for said amounts enter, and 
continue to be in force, when Appellant has never had her day in Court. The issue 
of the $7,000.00 must be settled before Appellant may seek her default being set 
aside.  TR.  February 23, 2009, P. 34, L.20-25.
14.  Appellant was also ordered to pay the attorney's fees of all parties 
present at a January 20, 2009 hearing due to a lack of a transcript with an affidavit 
being filed so that a motion to strike filed by Appellant could be heard.  R. 1221, 
1268, TR.  January 20, 2009, P.16.  However, Appellee could not have proceeded 
with his motion assuming arguendo, that the motion to strike was denied on said 
date, as he had inter alia, produced no evidence that any $7,000.00 had ever been 
received by Appellant, the Court had not clarified its' ruling regarding said 
$7,000.00 which it later admitted was unclear, the Appellee's counsel had refused 
to have a conference with opposing counsel to rectify the disputed order as ordered 
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by the Court's minute entry, and his claims to substantiate said $7,000.00 having 
been received by Appellant in his pleadings were based on impermissible hearsay 
which was objected to by Appellant in her relevant objection.   R. 1268, 1267.
15.  Appellant filed an Objection to Commissioner’s Recommendation 
and Request for Evidentiary Hearing on March 9, 2009.  R. 1270.  The judge did 
not issue a decision on Appellant’s objection, yet still signed and entered an Order 
based on the Commissioner’s recommendation.  Ex. “1.”  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The facts of this case are egregious and result in extreme injustice. 
Appellee merely alleged that Appellant received $7,000.00 from the state of 
California, to cover the costs of care for the disabled children in her custody.  The 
allegation was contained in the Appellee’s Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, 
which the court inappropriately entered, denying the Appellant an evidentiary 
hearing on the merits of said restraining order, thereby violating her due process 
rights.
Furthermore,  despite  the  Appellee’s  inability  to  proceed  with  his 
motion due to his lack of evidence that Appellant ever received $7,000.00, and 
despite  the  court’s  later  admission  that  its  ruling  regarding  the  $7,000.00  was 
unclear, the court erroneously ordered that the Appellant was to pay all parties’ 
attorney fees.
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The commissioner further held the Appellant in contempt, which is not 
an authority reserved for a commissioner, but rather the responsibility of a judge. 
The  commissioner’s  exercise  of  contempt  power  far  exceeds  the  scope  of  his 
authority, and was in clear error in this case.
Additionally, the Appellant filed a timely and valid Objection to the 
form and content of the August 18, 2008 orders of the District Court.  However, 
the judge did not issue a response to said Objection, and it is questionable whether 
he reviewed it at all, as the Appellee’s Order was entered, despite said Objection, 
which was in error.
ARGUMENT
I. Appellant was denied due process of law for denial of the opportunity to 
present evidence regarding time periods for child support and whether 
monies she received followed the children.
Appellant was denied due process of law when she was denied her day 
in court and was not allowed to present evidence. In general, the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and in Article 1 of the Utah Constitution, and provides that the 
government shall not take a person’s life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. U.S. Const. XIV, Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.  Due process entails fair process/
procedure, which requires at least an opportunity to present objections and 
evidence to a fair and neutral decisionmaker.  Id.  The Appellant, Ms. Anderson 
was deprived of money in the amount of $7,000.00, which is property, and she was 
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not given an opportunity to demonstrate that child support did not follow the 
children.  TR.  August 18, 2009, P.71, L.5.    
In his Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, the Appellee alleged that the 
Ms. Anderson had received $7,000.00 from the state of California in support of the 
parties minor children.  At the October 27, 2008 hearing, the court became angry at 
the parties for arguing over each other’s failures and non-compliance with court 
orders, so it entered the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, without allowing 
Appellant to have an evidentiary hearing on the merits of said Restraining Order. 
TR.  February 23, 2009, P.37, L. 5-10.  Ms. Anderson was denied her “day in 
court,” otherwise known as her procedural due process rights, as required by both 
federal and state law, and evidenced by precedent of the Supreme Court.  Bailey v. 
Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, (Utah 2002).  
Additionally, the court refused to hear Appellant’s objection to the 
Restraining Order, completely ignoring the Appellee’s lack of evidence of monies 
received by the Appellant, and disregarding the Order entered from a prior hearing 
regarding the monies following the children, and the amount of time Appellant had 
the children and was entitled to support.  R. 1267.
The court disregarded the facts, and refused to allow Appellant to present 
evidence as to the 17 of 31 days she had custody of the children during October 
2008, which would entitle her to more than half of the monies from the alleged 
$7,000.00 received for the children’s care in November 2008, on a pro rata basis 
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for the days she had the custody of the children for their care and maintenance, and 
ordered the money to be given to the Appellee.  TR. 36-37, February 23, 2009, R. 
1105.  Additionally, the Appellee alleges that the entire $7,000.00 amount received 
in October 2008, was actually for the support of the children for September 2008, 
which would then entitle the Appellant to the entire amount, as she is the parent 
who had custody of the children at that time.           
By entering the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, the $7,000.00 that 
the Appellant alleged received, was awarded in total to the Appellee, even though 
he only had the children for 14 days in October 2008, and despite the prior Order 
of the court which stated that the monies follow the children.  R. 1105.  Therefore, 
Appellant’s  due process rights were severely denied, and she should get her day in 
court to object and present evidence thereupon.   
II. The Court abused its discretion when it ordered Appellant to pay all 
attorney’s fees for all parties at the January 20, 2009 hearing when 
Appellee could not have prevailed on his motion at said hearing due to 
his noncompliance with court orders and the rules of Civil Procedure 
even if Appellant’s Motion to Strike had been denied.
At the hearing held January 20, 2009, the court entered an Order that 
Appellant pay for her own attorney fees, as well as the Appellee’s attorney fees, 
GAL’s fees, and Special Master’s attorney fees, which was in error because the 
Appellant was not given the opportunity to present findings as to the Appellee’s 
need for payment of such fees, the Appellant’s ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of such fees, which is required when entering such order, otherwise 
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remand for reconsideration is necessary.  Rhen v. Rhen, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 
1999); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998); Williamson v. 
Williamson, 983 2P.d 1103 (Utah App. 1999).  In this case, the court completely 
ignored, and did not even bother to inquire into the Appellant’s ability to pay said 
fees.  
In fact, the Appellant cannot afford to pay her attorney fees, let alone the 
Appellee’s fees.  According to the Worksheet Verification Affidavit and Statement 
of Compliance filed with the Attorney General’s Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Temporary Relief on March 26, 2009, the Appellee gross monthly 
income is believed to be $5,605.00, while the Appellant’s income is only 
$1,138.00.  R.  1330, 1331, Ex. “2.”  If anything, the Appellant shows a need of 
her Attorney fees being paid, rather than Appellee showing his fees need to be 
paid, because his income far exceeds her income.  The Appellant should have been 
given an opportunity to present evidence of her inability to pay Appellee’s attorney 
fees, and produce evidence of her financial need, anything less than such inquiry 
and opportunity to be heard is an abuse of discretion.  Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 
641 (Utah 1980).    
In this case, the court did not consider any of the requisites for a finding of 
attorney fees to be paid by the Appellant, but instead ordered payment of such fees 
due to the Appellant’s failure to file a transcript with an affidavit so that her 
Motion to Strike could be heard.  However, the affidavit as to the miscalendaring, 
16
would have been from Appellant’s attorney, but could not be written because the 
court ruled that said attorney was not a witness, and could not file such affidavit. 
This is a clear abuse of discretion by the court.
Furthermore, the Appellee could not proceed on his motion because he 
produced no evidence of Appellant’s receipt of $7,000.00, which the court later 
admitted was in fact unclear.  In this case, it would have been proper for the court 
to award costs and attorney fees if it determined that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense.  Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (2).  However, that 
did not happen in this case because the Appellee could not even proceed with his 
claim, let alone prevail.
Additionally, Appellee’s counsel refused to have a conference with 
Appellant’s counsel to rectify the disputed Order, as ordered, and noted in the 
minute entry, which led to claims of said $7,000.00 being received by Appellant on 
impermissible hearsay, and causing further attorney fees to incur due to Appellee 
and his actions.  R. 1221.  Therefore, Appellee should be required to pay the 
parties’ attorney fees, or in the alternative, each party be ordered to pay their own. 
III. The District Court Commissioner did not have the authority to hold 
Appellant in contempt for penalties greater than those of mere 
courtroom violations.
The court’s finding of Appellant, Ms. Anderson, in contempt was in error.  
In order to find contempt, the court must find from clear and convincing evidence 
that the person to be held in contempt knew what was required of her, had the 
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ability to comply, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to so.  Coleman 
v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983).  The court commissioner—not the 
assigned judge—made a verbal ruling that the Appellant was in contempt because 
she had not followed the directives of the Special Master, rendering her in 
contempt of court orders.  R. 1097.  However, the hearing was before 
Commissioner Patton, rather than Judge McDade, and it is Appellant’s position in 
this appeal that a District Court commissioner’s contempt authority does not reach 
that of a judge’s authority on such matters. A commissioner may punish for 
contempt only by a fine not to exceed $500.00 or by incarceration for five days or 
both.  Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310. 
The due process provision of the federal constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV, requires that in a prosecution for a contempt not committed in the presence of 
a court, the person charged should be advised of the nature of the action against 
him or her, have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the right to confront 
witnesses, and have the right to offer testimony on his or her behalf. Boggs v. 
Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah 1991).  These protections are amplified upon in the 
Utah Code, which requires, inter alia, that in a case of indirect contempt, an 
affidavit must be presented to a court reciting the facts constituting the contempt in 
order to ensure that the court and the person charged are informed of the conduct 
alleged to be contemptuous.  Id. 
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When contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of 
the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which an order 
must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, 
adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and 
that he be punished as prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10 hereof.  Id.  When 
contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or 
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts 
constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators 
or other judicial officers.  Id.  In this case, the appellant was not held in contempt 
for acts committed in the immediate view of the court, but for those outside the 
presence thereof, yet there was no affidavit presented or statement of facts by the 
appropriate authorities to support such contempt holding.
In Order to determine a question of contempt, the trial court must 
memorialize its judgment by entering written findings of fact and conclusions. 
Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543 (Utah 1981).  The Appellant in this case was 
not allowed to enter such written findings of fact and conclusions.   
Findings of fact are necessary to support judgment of contempt, so that 
where judgement of contempt was supported by no other finding except that 
defendant, who was found guilty in a separate proceeding, was guilty of contempt 
because of failure to comply with court order as to payments, and there was no 
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finding with respect to defendant’s ability to pay, judgment of contempt was void. 
State v. Bartholomew, 38 P.2d 753 (Utah 1934). 
Supreme Court’s review of a contempt citation involves questions of 
whether the underlying order is lawful; and whether the party’s conduct in 
violating the order constitutes contempt of court.  Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass’n v. 
Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988).
In State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983), a modification hearing 
was converted into a contempt trial based on proffers, which creates a situation 
where conviction of indirect contempt must be reversed where evidentiary 
procedures were not followed.  Id. at 1156.  Similar to Halverson, evidentiary 
procedures were not followed in this case, and the court’s finding of appellant in 
contempt should be reversed, as such finding was in error.
Hearings in front of a commissioner are brief, and parties are only afforded 
an opportunity to proffer testimony, present affidavits and oral argument, but do 
not get to present evidence by way of personal testimony, confront witnesses, nor 
cross examine as required by the rules of evidence.  Furthermore, such procedures 
as occurred in this case have been historically practiced by Commissioner Patton in 
his courtroom, where people are immediately taken from his courtroom for 
incarceration, without an evidentiary hearing, without the filing of findings and 
conclusions, and without any of the other procedural safeguards established by 
appellate courts of this state and the United States Supreme Court.
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We have been unable to find any case dealing with this issue in Utah where 
commissioners exercise contempt power beyond using it to maintain control in 
their courtrooms, nor do we find any authority that allows district court 
commissioners such far reaching contempt authority, including the right to avoid 
filing findings and conclusions in any case.  However, it seems clear from the 
authorities cited that such actions by district court commissioners far exceeds their 
authority.  Therefore, appellant respectfully submits that the commissioner’s 
holding of the Appellant in contempt was in error.  
IV. The trial court erred in signing the Order from the August 18, 2009 
hearing despite there being an Objection, and without review of said 
Objection to proposed Order.
The trial court should not have signed and entered the Order from the 
hearing of August 18, 2009 because there was a pending Objection in need of 
review and response.  Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate in the district court, 
requesting correction of the Order, to strike therefrom many inappropriate 
documents, argumentative language, and material the court requested not be 
included.  R. 1103.  During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while 
the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.  Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 60 (a).
The district court failed to issue a ruling on Appellant’s objection regarding 
form and content of the Order.  R. 1600.  It is unknown whether the Appellant’s 
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Objection was even read by the judge, or at least considered.  Although there is a 
lack of relevant case or statutory law in regards to judges issuing responses to 
objections, it is equitable that the judge be required to issue a response to said 
objection, and within a reasonable amount of time.  The Appellant filed numerous 
Motions to Stay Appeal, while waiting for review of her objection and entry of a 
Final Order.  The Order was finally entered, yet there is still no ruling from the 
court to the Appellant’s Objection.  R. 1584.  
As a matter of public policy procedure, the District Court should be required 
to offer a ruling on an objection to a commissioner’s recommendation prior to 
entering a final Order in a matter.  No such procedure was followed in this case, 
and as such, the trial court’s entry of the Order prior to responding to the 
Appellant’s meritorious objection was in error.  Therefore, the Order should be 
vacated, and the district court should issue a ruling on the Appellant’s objection. 
CONCLUSION
An individual’s right to due process is a fundamental Constitutional 
right.  Ms. Anderson has been denied this right because she was not given an 
opportunity to present evidence and have her day in court before a judgment was 
entered against her, awarding Appellee $7,000.00.  
Furthermore, Appellant was ordered to pay all parties’ attorney fees, but 
should not have been, because the Appellee was in violation of prior court Orders, 
and could not have proceeded with his action, as he has not complied with the rules 
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of civil procedure, and the court did not consider Appellant’s lacking ability to pay 
such fees, or the reasonableness thereof. 
Also, Appellant was held in contempt, which was beyond the scope of the 
commissioner’s contempt authority.  
Additionally, the final Order in this matter was entered without 
consideration of nor response to Appellant’s Objection to the Order.  Appellant, 
Ms. Anderson, respectfully asks this court to reverse the decision of the trial court, 
and remand the issue of the $7,000.00 for an evidentiary hearing by the District 
Court.
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____ day of April, 2010.
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UTAH  COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET




11. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and
	
1///////////:///////////l
(father for whom support is to be awarded.
	 I///////////I///////////110
	
12a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to
	
1//////////I
Instructions for definition of income.
	 1$1138.00	 1$5605.00	 1//////////I
12b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not
	
1//////////I
enter alimony ordered for this case).
	 1-0.00	 1-0.00	 1//////////l
12c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
	
I//////////I
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1).
	 1-0.00	 1-0.00	 I//////////I
12d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in
	
1//////////1
Present Home Worksheet for either parent.
	 1-0.00	 1-0.00	 1//////////1
13. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted
Gross Income for child support purposes.
	 1$1138.00	 1$5605.00	 1$6743.00	 I
1.4. Take the COMBINED figure in line 3 and the number of children in 1///////////l///////////I
(Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support
	
I///////////I///////////I
Obligation.	 Enter it here.	 I/////////%21///////////1$3508.00
	 I







[COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
	 116.9%	 183.1%	 1//////////I





Ishare of the Base Support Obligation.
	 1$593.00	 1$2915.00	 I//////////1



















amount(s) all 12 months of the year.
	 1$593.00	 1$2915.00	 I//////////I
8.
	









1 KELLY LLOYD ANDERSON
1 DEBORAH ELIZABETH ANDERSON
9. Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 7?
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
	 (Father) $
10. What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
() property settlement
() excessive debts of the marriage








(Mother) and answer number 10.
06/2000
0,0132
